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INTRODUCTION
In 1864, a New York trial court confronted a fairly run-of-the-mill
1
entrapment defense. The judge, like most judges at the time,
rejected the defense, admonishing that the great Lawgiver overruled
such tactics back when Eve complained, “the serpent beguiled me,
2
and I did eat.”
The decades that followed witnessed an
unprecedented retreat from this lofty precedent. State and federal
courts throughout the union began to recognize and elaborate on
3
the entrapment defense around the turn of the century. In 1932,
the Supreme Court followed in kind by holding the defense implicit
4
in all federal criminal statutes. Ever since, entrapment has occupied
a rather small and uncontroversial corner of criminal law. Recently,
however, courts and scholars have struggled to define entrapment in
5
the context of increasingly intrusive law enforcement techniques.
Analyzed in various ways, the entrapment defense excuses a
defendant when the actions of government officials produced the
crime of which he stands charged. Since its inception, most courts
have employed a subjective test, asking whether the individual
∗
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defendant was predisposed to commit the crime before encouraged
6
to do so by some state actor. A minority of courts and many
commentators, however, espouse a test that inquires whether law
7
enforcement officials acted in an objectively reasonable way.
Entrapment was born in an era when most areas of the law were
8
tilting away from subjective tests toward more objective tests. This
article seeks to answer (1) why entrapment emerged when it did and
(2) why courts stubbornly cling to an outmoded subjective
entrapment analysis.
The answer to the first of these questions is, on one level, quite
simple. After the Civil War, state governments grew and police forces
grew with them. As the federal government expanded, so too did its
arm of law enforcement. The people needed protection from this
law enforcement leviathan and sought this protection in the courts.
By the end of the century, the machinery of the state had
transformed so radically that the law could no longer protect
individuals by securing a boundary around their person and their
property. Serving as neutral arbiter between one individual and the
next proved not only insufficient, but also impossible. Notions of
voluntary contractual relations, even stretched to their extreme,
could not accommodate the modern state with its many tentacles
reaching into realms of privacy that people never thought could be
9
threatened.
Sting operations conducted by state and federal
detectives offered a fairly concrete example of how government had
outgrown its neutral status.
Thus, the state seemed both
impersonal—in its growingly distant, bureaucratic, and centralized
form—and, ironically, visible—in officers’ presence in the average
citizen’s daily life. Entrapment emerged in response to the conflict
between these two visions of the state as one of many turn-of-thecentury legal developments that subtly redrew the boundary between
the individual and the government.
This brings us to the answer to the second question. As the law
of contract, tort, and property all espoused an objective test, the
space for free will and autonomy in the law diminished, leaving a
6
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theoretical vacuum in its wake. As Morton Horwitz explained, by the
time the progressive legal thinkers launched their attack on natural
rights in the 1920s and 30s, the idea that the law could actually
uncover some real subjective intent and preserve a sacred area of free
10
will was already largely discredited.
The vast and complicated
nature of modern economic interactions had rendered that ideal
11
mythical, at best. So, Oliver Wendell Holmes’s reasonable man took
the place of each individual and policy determined how that
12
reasonable man should and would act in any given instance. Legal
historians argue that this set the stage for the law’s turn to the social
13
sciences. Courts, however, never collapsed into mere brokers for
different social scientific theories, and the notion that the law can,
and should, seek to define subjective intent, freedom, and autonomy
did not disappear. Rather, it migrated to different areas and took
different forms. By uncovering those forms, we begin to catch a
glimpse of how the law redefined freedom and individuality in
reaction to the new constellation of economic, social, and political
14
forces.
Thus, entrapment grew as a response to the increasingly
pervasive and invasive forms of law enforcement, but it was not an
inevitable reaction to the sudden expansion in the nature and scope
of state and federal police power. Entrapment emerged as a piece of
a puzzle: an innovative way to police the boundaries between
government and the individual in the newly drawn precincts of the
modern state. I have divided my discussion of the history of
entrapment law to illustrate this thesis. Part I of this article briefly
reviews the social and political context of post-Civil War America and
elaborates on the changes in law enforcement at the time. Part II
discusses the history of both the state and federal defense of
10
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REORIENTATION OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL THOUGHT, 1890-1930, at 4-5 (1977). The law
was left to concede or to find a new place for freedom within its doctrine.
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entrapment. Part III analyzes some of the implications of this history,
gives an overview of the current debate over how the defense ought
to function, and places it in context of the history of entrapment law.
Finally, without falling too easily into the trap that history, custom,
and past practice should dictate policy, I will argue that given the
history of entrapment, a modified subjective test provides the
15
appropriate analysis.
In addition, the history of entrapment
illustrates how the defense fits into criminal law and counsels against
extending it to cases where private parties rather than government
officials entrap an individual.
I. HISTORY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
Organized state police forces are a relatively modern innovation.
In the colonial period, citizens bore a collective responsibility for law
enforcement and every adult male shared a duty to serve as constable
16
or hire someone to take his turn. As individuals grew increasingly
wary of such periodic police duties, many towns began to elect
constables who would hire a number of watchmen, and the powers of
17
the police increased gradually.
These constables had broad
18
administrative responsibilities beyond law enforcement.
Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, the police remained loosely
19
organized and largely ineffectual. Most towns employed one chief
20
and a dozen or so patrolmen. The towns paid their chief fees for
certain tasks rather than a salary and the chief, in turn, paid the
21
patrolmen. In most cases, victims bore the cost of prosecution, and
15

For a pathbreaking review of the role that history has, and should, play in legal
thought, see Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995).
16
DAVID R. JOHNSON, AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT: A HISTORY 5-7 (1981). The
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police. See KENNETH J. PEAK, POLICING AMERICA 5-6 (1997). In 1663, King Charles II
replaced this force with a night watch and constable system composed primarily of
old men, commonly called the “Old Charlies.” GEORGE ASTOR, THE NEW YORK COPS
10 (1971). The dominant law enforcement persona in the rural south was the sheriff
rather than the constable. See FRANK RICHARD PRASSEL, THE WESTERN PEACE OFFICER:
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17
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18
Id. at 3.
19
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20
Id. at 46-49.
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Id. at 61.
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as a result, police tended to focus on crimes against property, leaving
22
many more violent personal crimes unsolved.
Law enforcement in the southern colonies was similarly
haphazard, consisting, in most cases, of a single sheriff who harbored
23
a vast number of responsibilities on top of policing. Towns in the
south, however, faced the additional problem of slave insurrections.
Beginning in the early eighteenth century, southern citizens
supplemented the nascent police department by serving on “slave
patrols” designed to retrieve runaway slaves and prevent slave
24
revolts.
Territorial expansion and tensions produced by slavery
stretched the limits of community policing. Throughout the rural
south and the west, wherever sheriffs and slave patrols failed to
25
preserve the peace, bands of vigilantes filled the vacuum.
The turn of the eighteenth century witnessed unprecedented
urban growth. Between 1790 and 1830, due in part to immigration
from central and northern Europe, as well as mass industrialization
26
and migration from rural America, cities almost quadrupled in size.
In the decades after 1830, urban centers experienced a population
27
boom that would not subside for close to a century. Faced with
increased crime and social tension that accompanied such sudden
growth and diversity, the larger American cities took their cue from
across the Atlantic and began to establish more organized
hierarchical police forces designed primarily to prevent crime by
28
constant patrol. Boston established the first such police unit in 1844
29
and New York followed suit in 1854. In the following decades, most
American cities created similar organizations, but, unlike their British
22
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CITIES & TOWNS, 1780-1980, at 70 (1988) [hereinafter MONKKONEN, AMERICA
BECOMES URBAN].
28
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counterpart, the police throughout America remained under
30
municipal control throughout the century. The decentralized local
nature of American policing persisted, in part, out of adherence to
an important theoretical ideal tying the people to the execution of
their laws. The European state and national police forces—far
removed from ordinary citizens—were perceived as uniquely
31
undemocratic, quasi-military forces.
Alexis de Tocqueville
commented on the decentralized structure of American law
enforcement, observing that it was nonetheless effective because
individuals felt that reporting crimes and assisting in law enforcement
was an integral part of their responsibility as citizens of a democratic
32
state.
What is important is not the accuracy of Tocqueville’s
somewhat romantic rendition of American law enforcement, but
rather the theoretical appeal of local, decentralized police to a
nineteenth-century democratic vision.
In fact, local police could not possibly accommodate the
increasingly national scope of criminal syndicates. Even before the
Civil War, private detective agencies lent their expertise to assist the
fledgling municipal police in capturing outlaws like Jesse James and
Butch Cassidy, whose notorious crimes spanned city and state
33
boundaries. The most famous of these was the Pinkerton National
Detective Agency, founded in 1855 by Allan Pinkerton, a Scottish
34
immigrant living in Chicago. Prior to the Civil War, the agency also
served as a labor spy service, providing businesses with “spotters” who
disguised themselves as workers to detect lazy or dishonest
35
employees. Gaining expertise and national prominence in the Civil
War, the Pinkertons assisted the Chief of the Secret Service by
36
After the war, labor conflict
infiltrating the confederate ranks.
reached a heightened pitch. Employed essentially as spies for the
state, the Pinkertons used informers and undercover agents to
undermine union strike efforts and assist the government in labor
37
discipline. Hired initially by private businesses, the Pinkertons often
30
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(Robert P. Weiss ed., 1999).
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Id. at 360.
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ended up working with local police and federal officials in staging
38
undercover operations.
Up until the end of the nineteenth century, police served a far
broader social role than in our modern conception. They bore much
of the burden of social welfare, housing the homeless, and caring for
39
the poor during that early period. By the 1890s, however, the police
were engaged less actively in the problems of every-day life. They
abandoned care for the homeless and focused almost exclusively on
40
crime control.
Historian Eric Monkkonen argues that this shift
precipitated a greater distrust, estrangement, and anonymity between
41
the city residents and their police. During this same period, police
organization mirrored the decentralized nature of urban American
politics. Aldermen or city councilmen nominated police chiefs for
42
their own wards.
Throughout the country the police gradually
allied with corrupt city politicians and grew increasingly ineffective at
43
managing the escalating crime rates. This was in part due to the
steep increase in urban crime, combined with the forces’ poor
44
organization and rudimentary equipment. But it also resulted from
a kind of deliberate tolerance, and at times, an outright acceptance
45
of vice. Ward bosses depended on police to manipulate the polls,
provide patronage jobs, and grant favors for constituents. Police
officers and their supervisors in turn were beholden to politicians for
46
their jobs and coveted promotions.
Officers in New York, for
example, paid regular fees to Tammany leaders, which they then
recouped by extorting money from saloons, gambling houses, and
47
brothels. Thus, city politics operated in the shadow of this uneasy
48
alliance between police, politicians, and the underworld.
WORKPLACE, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN LABOR ACTIVISM, 1865-1925, at 37-38 (1993).
38
See, e.g., Speiden v. State, 3 Tex. Ct. App. 156 (1877). Between the years of
1892 and 1910, the Pinkertons opened fifteen new branch offices, worked
increasingly with state authorities, and served basically as spies for the state. See
Weiss, supra note 34, at 362.
39
MONKKONEN, POLICE IN URBAN AMERICA, supra note 19, at 150.
40
Id. at 156-57.
41
See id. at 157-61.
42
WALKER, supra note 28, at 9.
43
See FOGELSON, supra note 31, at 1-12.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
JAY STUART BERMAN, POLICE ADMINISTRATION AND PROGRESSIVE REFORM:
THEODORE ROOSEVELT AS POLICE COMMISSIONER OF NEW YORK 17-20 (1987).
47
See ASTOR, supra note 16, at 57-60.
48
See Mark H. Haller, Historical Roots of Police Behavior: Chicago, 1890-1925, in
POLICE, PRISON, AND PUNISHMENT 323, 330-34 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1987); see also
FOGELSON, supra note 31, at 5-10.
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Because police depended on revenue from crime just as the
politicians depended on votes and fees from the police, officers did
49
not attempt to suppress crime or vice; they regulated it. Police in
Chicago, for example, facilitated illicit activity by dividing their beats
between warring gangs of pickpockets. They staged arrests so that
angry victims would feel vindicated, and then promptly released the
50
To further this symbiotic relationship,
culprit for a small fee.
detectives developed a network of informers and maintained
extensive relationships with the underworld. As historian Mark
Haller observed about the Chicago police at the turn of the century,
“[e]ven conscientious detectives were so involved with the
underworld that there was only a thin line between being guardians
51
against crime and partners with criminals.”
The situation did not escape the vigilance of the progressive
52
reform movement. In fact, the police—an all too concrete symbol
of the success of immigrant values over middle-class mores—became
53
one of the central objects of the movement’s attention. Not only
were detectives and officers tolerating vice and crime, they were
lining their pockets with the proceeds. As a result, policemen proved
ineffectual at preventing other sorts of street crimes. They spent

49

FOGELSON, supra note 31, at 32.
Haller, supra note 48, at 332.
51
Id at 331.
52
See WALKER, supra note 28, at 65-66; see also BERMAN, supra note 46, at 2-14;
FOGELSON, supra note 31, at 2-12. In New York City, the reform movement managed
to set up an investigative committee chaired by Republican Senator Clarence Lexow
to examine police corruption. See BERMAN, supra note 46, at 31-32. The report,
together with mounting public concern, culminated in the election of the antiTammany mayor William Strong. Id. Success, however, proved short-lived. Id. Like
most cities, corruption persisted in police and municipal government well into this
century. Id.
53
The historiography of the progressive era reform movement is vast, and
historians disagree about the precise meaning of the term. Among the contending
overviews are ALLEN F. DAVIS, SPEARHEADS OF REFORM: THE SOCIAL SETTLEMENTS AND
THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT, 1890-1914 (1968); ROBERT WEIBE, THE SEARCH FOR
ORDER (1967); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM (1955). More recent
scholars have approached progressivism from social and cultural angles adding
countless wrinkles, nuances, and critiques of the earlier histories. See, e.g., GEORGE
CHAUNCEY, GAY NEW YORK: GENDER, URBAN CULTURE, AND THE MAKING OF THE GAY
MALE WORLD, 1890-1940 (1994); LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE
POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE, BOSTON, 1880-1960 (1988); ALICE KESSLERHARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES
(1982). For an ambitious attempt to synthesize the material and distill some
common elements of the era’s reform impulse, see Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search of
Progressivism, 10 REVS. IN AM. HIST. 113, 113-32 (1982). For specific discussions of
progressivism and corrupt urban politics, see JOHN D. BUENKER, URBAN LIBERALISM
AND PROGRESSIVE REFORM (1973); ZANE MILLER, BOSS COX’S CINCINNATI (1968).
50
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their days at the local saloon, tavern, and brothels, anywhere but their
54
respective beat.
Beginning around the turn of the century,
reformers both inside and outside of the department sought to purge
the police of such corruption and remove the force from the taint of
55
the lower class immigrants’ questionable moral compass.
In the
56
spirit of the times, reformers pushed for greater professionalism.
Following the example of August Vollmer, the Chief of Police in
Berkeley, California, reformers advocated more scientific methods of
crime detection, standardized admission requirements, formal
education, centralization, improved technology, and higher
57
standards of policing.
Meanwhile, businesses took matters into their own hands, hiring
private detectives to protect their interests. Government officials
joined forces only after private detectives had employed covert tactics
58
For instance, in Wisconsin, an employer,
to uncover the crime.
suspecting that a disgruntled employee whom he recently fired posed
a threat, hired a detective to seek out the employee and try to
59
embroil him in a scheme to blow up his former place of business.
The private detectives informed the police only after they had
60
encouraged the employee to buy dynamite and other explosives.
Businesses also hired private detective agencies to uncover crime and
city corruption that threatened their chances at prized government
contracts. In Ohio, a manufacturer’s association hired the Burns
Detective Agency to root out corruption in the Columbus city
61
government. The private detectives did not call the prosecuting
54

WALKER, supra note 28, at 10, 24.
See FOGELSON, supra note 31, at 67-92. Fogelson lists a number of reform
initiatives. He argues that reformers sought to impose a military structure on the
police, to centralize their operations, and remove the force from local control. See id.
56
As a part of the general faith in scientific methods during the progressive era,
reformers uniformly sought to professionalize many different areas of American
culture. For histories of professionalization in the progressive era, see REGINA G.
KUNZEL, FALLEN WOMEN, PROBLEM GIRLS: UNMARRIED MOTHERS AND THE
PROFESSIONALIZATION OF SOCIAL WORK, 1890-1945 (1993); THOMAS HASKELL, THE
EMERGENCE OF THE PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCES: THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE
ASSOCIATION AND THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS OF AUTHORITY (1977); DOROTHY
ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCES (1991); BURTON BLEDSTEIN, THE
CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM (1976).
57
WALKER, supra note 28, at 130; see also JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 70-71.
58
See Weiss, supra note 34, at 358-62.
59
Koscak v. State, 152 N.W. 181, 183 (Wis. 1915).
60
Id.
61
As an illustration of the permeable nature of private and public policing at this
time, Harvey M. Dougherty, the head of the Secret Service during the Harding
administration, appointed William J. Burns, the founder of the private detective
agency involved in many of these early entrapment cases, chief of the Bureau of
55
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attorney until they had installed a dictograph in a hotel room where
62
the staged bribe was set to take place.
63
After 1920, police reform enjoyed some modicum of success.
Centralized bureaucracies began to replace decentralized precincts,
which wrested some control from ward politicians. Reformers
managed to impose certain educational standards and routine
64
training. The success of police reform tacked with the ebb and flow
of municipal reform in general. Formal authority, however, did not
always correspond to actual power, and ward leaders retained a large
degree of power well into the century even as they grew wary of
65
displaying it with the abandon of earlier decades. Beginning in the
early 1900s, reformers in some states did succeed in organizing state
police forces. In the nineteenth century, only Massachusetts and
66
Texas had state police.
By 1923, fifteen states (mostly northern
67
industrial states) established similar state law enforcement bodies.
One historian called these new state police forces an “unprecedented
68
extension of government into the lives of ordinary citizens.”
Perhaps
even
more
significant
than
centralization,
professionalization, privatization, and state control, was the growing
influence of the federal government in law enforcement. In theory,
federal law enforcement dated back to the Federal Judiciary Act of
69
1789. Among other things, the Act gave federal courts exclusive
jurisdiction over “offences cognizable under the authority of the
70
United States.” Leaving the term undefined, Congress enumerated
several specific federal offenses the following year in the Crimes Act

Investigation in 1921. See Weis, supra note 34, at 365-71. Later, Burns worked with
his old agency in prosecuting various high profile syndicalism cases, including the
well-known case of Charles Ruthenberg in April 1923. Id. In that case, the defense
attorney accused the government of using the Burns agency to plant documents that
would support its case of espionage. Id.
62
Diegel v. State, 1911 WL 680, at *4, *5 (Ohio Cir. Oct. 17, 1911). The same
agency was involved in efforts to root out city corruption in New Jersey and
Maryland. See State v. Dougherty, 86 N.J. 525, 531-33, 93 A. 98, 101 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
1915); Hummelshime v. State, 93 A. 990 (Md. 1915).
63
See JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 105-15.
64
Id. at 105.
65
See FOGELSON, supra note 31, at 110-12.
66
JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 156.
67
See id. at 155-61.
68
Wilbur R. Miller, Police Authority in London and New York City, 1830-1870, in
SOCIAL HISTORY OF CRIME, POLICING AND PUNISHMENT 335 (Robert P. Weiss ed., 1999).
69
1 Cong. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
70
DWIGHT F. HENDERSON, CONGRESS, COURTS, AND CRIMINALS: THE DEVELOPMENT
OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW, 1801-1829, at 5 (1985).
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of 1790. Congress added crimes to the list throughout the century,
but the number and scope of these federal crimes remained fairly
72
circumscribed until the end of the century. The Judiciary Act also
created the office of the United States Marshall, the first federal law
73
enforcement agency.
The United States Marshals Service grew
increasingly responsible for bringing some modest sense of order to
74
the relatively ineffectual law enforcement on the new frontier.
By the end of the nineteenth century, the number of federal
crimes and the reach of federal criminal law had expanded. Federal
law enforcement, however, developed or evolved haphazardly within
different branches of government, in response to the advent of
different crimes. For example, when Congress made mail fraud a
crime, the post office developed agents who were eventually
75
organized as the Division of Postal Inspectors in 1875. Similarly, the
Treasury Department developed special agents assigned to both the
Customs Service and the Bureau of Internal Revenue to investigate
76
fraud and counterfeiting. As crime grew more national in scope,
each of these new enforcement teams developed ties with the other,
and, more importantly, with municipal and state police
77
departments. For instance, in response to the Comstock Law of
78
1873, which outlawed sending obscene materials through the mail,
federal postal inspectors developed intricate networks with local
police and exchanged information they received on state crimes for
79
help with federal prosecutions.
That same year, the government created the Secret Service to
80
protect the newly standardized currency.
At first, the agency
consisted of a few private detectives, who quickly developed a fairly
sophisticated system of informers and stool pigeons to pursue the
81
increasingly rampant and extensive counterfeit rings. By the late
nineteenth century, however, the Secret Service became a kind of allpurpose federal police department, lending its expertise to almost

71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

1 Cong. Ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112 (1790).
See HENDERSON, supra note 70, at 5-7.
VILA & MORRIS, supra note 23, at 67.
PRASSEL, supra note 11, at 221.
JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 75, 78.
Id.
See id. at 75-87.
42 Cong. Ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598 (1873).
JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 79-80.
Id. at 81.
Id. at 83-85.
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82

any federal agency that needed it. However, in 1908, responding to
some threatening investigations into the suspect behavior of several
individual congressmen, Congress restricted the use of the Secret
Service to policing counterfeit currency and protecting the
83
president. In a blatant act of defiance, Attorney General Charles
Bonaparte responded to this display of self-interest by singlehandedly creating the Bureau of Investigation within the Department
84
of Justice.
Theodore Roosevelt ordered the Secret Service to
transfer eight agents to the new Bureau, soon to be renamed the
85
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
As legal historian Lawrence Friedman noted, “if the central
86
government swells and bloats, that must have consequences” —and it
did just that. In the first few decades of the twentieth century,
Congress stretched its new regulatory wings. In 1913, Congress
enacted the first real income tax, which drew a whole new set of
87
crimes and prosecutions in its wake. In addition, it set in motion a
88
wide variety of regulatory statutes, including the Mann Act, which
prohibited the transport of women across state lines for immoral
89
purposes, thereby increasing demand for federal law enforcement.
World War I spawned yet more federal legislation, which in turn,
escalated the need for more organized and powerful federal police.
The Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service, and the Postal
Inspectors grew in numbers and force after Congress passed the
90
91
Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918. Following the
82

Id. at 85-86.
Id. at 86.
84
Id. at 168.
85
JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 168. The Bureau was renamed the Federal Bureau
of Investigation in 1935. VILA & MORRIS, supra note 23, at 117.
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LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 264 (1993).
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Underwood Tariff Act, Pub. L. No. 63-16, 63 Cong. Ch. 16, 38 Stat. 166, 171
(1913).
88
Pub. L. No. 61-277, 61 Cong. Ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910).
89
See supra note 87. The progressive era witnessed an unprecedented increase in
the federal government’s regulatory power. See WALKER, supra note 28, at 136-37.
Other acts included an act preventing income tax fraud; the Harrison Act, making it
a crime to import, manufacture and dispense certain drugs; and the Dyer Act,
making it a crime to drive a stolen vehicle across state lines. See FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT, supra note 86, at 354-57. For a general discussion of the extension of
state power into areas of everyday life, see ANDREW J. POLSKY, THE RISE OF THE
THERAPEUTIC STATE 65-136 (1991).
90
Pub. L. No. 65-24, 65 Cong. Ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (1917) (providing
sentences for aiding the enemy, obstructing recruitment, and mailing seditious
literature).
91
Pub. L. No. 65-150, 65 Cong. Ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (1918) (making it a crime to
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War, the infamous “Red Scare” solidified the power and intensified
92
the techniques of federal law enforcement.
In a gesture whose
historical import probably exceeded even its author’s imagination,
Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer named J. Edgar Hoover head of
93
the General Intelligence Division of the Department of Justice.
Perhaps the single most important catalyst in creating a federal
law enforcement presence and linking municipal police to a broad
94
The
national agenda was the advent of national prohibition.
Eighteenth Amendment, which went into effect in 1920, and its
95
statutory counterpart the Volstead Act, passed the year before, gave
96
federal agents license to intervene in unprecedented ways. National
prohibition promoted and deepened the relations between local,
state, and national law enforcement as federal officials worked in
97
conjunction, and shared information, with local police.
Thus,
prohibition institutionalized the federal wing of law enforcement
while simultaneously increasing the scope and creativity of its
98
undercover tactics.
During prohibition, the blurring of this side and that side of the
law, prevalent in progressive-era urban machine politics, took on

92

JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 171-72.
Id. at 171.
94
See generally KENNETH M. MURCHISON, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW DOCTRINE: THE
FORGOTTEN INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL PROHIBITION 1-22 (1994). The movement for
national prohibition actually began a century earlier. In 1826, temperance workers
formed the American Society for the Promotion of Temperance. Id. at 4. In the
1840s, reformers concentrated increasingly on moral persuasion rather than
legislation. Id. In the following decade, however, leaders of the temperance
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success in Maine in 1851, but many state courts overruled temperance legislation and
by 1869 only six states had extant prohibitory laws. Id. at 4-5. In the second half of
the nineteenth century, reformers formed the Prohibition party, which helped
defeat James G. Blaine in the 1884 presidential election. In 1874, the movement
gathered momentum when evangelical reformers formed the Women’s Christian
Temperance Union. Id. at 5. In 1893, the Anti-Saloon league emerged with a new
pragmatic non-partisan agenda. Id. It ultimately succeeded in securing prohibitory
laws in a majority of states. Id. at 6. In the early twentieth century, the league
succeeded in building a political base, lobbying for national anti-liquor regulations,
and ultimately pushing for national prohibition. Id. at 6-7.
95
Pub. L. No. 66-66, 66 Cong. Ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1919).
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Mark Keller, Alcohol Problems and Policies in Historical Perspective, in LAW,
ALCOHOL, AND ORDER: PERSPECTIVES ON NATIONAL PROHIBITION 159 (David Kyvig ed.,
1985).
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See JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 143-45; see also Wickersham Commission,
Enforcement of the Prohibition Laws of the United States: Message from the
President of the United States 37-43 (1931).
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federal dimensions. The examples could, and have, produced a
great number of contemporary and historical accounts. For the
purposes of this article national prohibition gave new inspiration to a
process that was already well underway. It drew local and national
police closer together while issuing broad licenses to enforcement
officials to pursue increasingly intricate undercover investigations.
For example, in an attempt to catch potential criminals in the act, the
Prohibition Bureau imported its own liquor from Canada to retail to
100
bootleggers. In an even an more flagrant use of illicit means to halt
the mass consumption of alcohol federal officials operated their own
speakeasy, called the Bridge Whist Club, in New York City and openly
101
sold liquor to any willing patron. Izzy Einstein and Moe Smith, two
of the more notorious prohibition agents, drew national media
attention when they topped the records in prohibition arrests by
disguising themselves as gravediggers, fishermen, vegetable vendors,
102
and musicians to infiltrate the underworld.
II. HISTORY OF THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE
Entrapment caught the attention of judges and academics in the
context of this rapidly transforming system of law enforcement. It
gradually took hold amidst the increasingly interrelated and invasive
tactics of both federal and local police. While it is impossible to
locate an exact date—a moment in time when the nature of policing
shifted in some critical way—entrapment emerged as law
enforcement itself had grown so remote from the original ideal
discussed by Tocqueville in mid-century as to be virtually
unrecognizable.
Historian Kenneth Murchison argues that
103
entrapment was a judicial response to national prohibition.
Prohibition was clearly a key factor in the consolidation of this new
defense, and it may, indeed, have been critical in causing the
Supreme Court to recognize a universal federal entrapment defense.
By looking at the state and federal cases both before and after
national prohibition in the context of the history of law enforcement
in general, it becomes clear that entrapment was not only a reaction
to prohibition, but also a cumulative response to the changed nature
of government. Entrapment profoundly altered the relationship
99

See MURCHISON, supra note 94, at 43.
Id.
101
Id.
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Id.; see also CHARLES MERTZ, THE DRY DECADE 136 (1931). Izzy Einstein and
Moe Smith were ultimately dismissed from the force when their widespread notoriety
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between officials on all levels of government and the average citizen.
This section of the article posits that entrapment has gone through
three different stages: first, the nineteenth-century private law model
of entrapment; second, the emergence of the defense as a means of
exonerating criminals who were “created” by the state; and finally,
the academic push for an objective model of entrapment designed to
104
deter government misconduct.
No state or federal court recognized entrapment as a valid
defense prior to 1870. State courts did develop and apply a common
law consent doctrine based on private law notions of contract that
provided a prototype for the later developed entrapment doctrine.
The doctrine of consent dictates that if force (or lack of consent) is
an element of a crime and the victim cooperates with authorities in
capturing the perpetrator, then courts cannot convict because the
very act of entrapping the criminal negates a material aspect of the
105
106
crime. In Eggington’s Case, an English decision from 1801, a band
of robbers planned to rob a manufactory near Birmingham. They
contacted Phillips, a servant and watchman of the business, to gain
valuable assistance in their plan. Phillips apparently agreed to help
but promptly reported the illicit plot to the proprietor, Mr. Boulton.
Boulton instructed Phillips to continue with the plan, contacted
authorities, and stood in wait as the unsuspecting robbers entered his
place of business. The court noted that when a property owner
cooperates with authorities in capturing a burglar, he essentially
assents to the entry, thereby negating trespass, an essential element of
the crime. All justices agreed, however, that knowledge of an
impending crime did not constitute consent to its commission.
Because Boulton did nothing to encourage the crime, he did not
107
assent to the entry, and the robbers were guilty as charged.
American courts used this consent doctrine in some form or
108
another throughout the early part of the century. Prior to the Civil
War, courts in the South used Eggington’s Case and similar precedents
to enforce various laws related to slavery. In 1832, for instance, a
South Carolina court upheld the conviction of a prisoner charged
109
with stealing a slave.
The defendant approached someone else’s

104

I have not put dates on these periods because there is significant overlap and
the shift occurs at different times in state and federal courts.
105
See 1 BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW § 262 (5th ed. 1872).
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2 East’s P.C. 666 (1801).
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Id. at 667.
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slave and attempted to persuade the slave to run away with him.
The slave reported the story to his master who contacted authorities
111
and instructed the slave to act as if he were going to comply. The
slave owner and the local police stood in wait and ultimately captured
112
the thief in the act. The court held, much like the earlier English
case, that the complicity of the slave owner does not negate the
element of “taking by force” because an attempt to detect a crime
113
already in progress does not constitute assent.
There was no
meeting of the minds because the thief did not know that the owner
114
had agreed. Thus, the court held the victim did not agree to have
115
his property taken and the defendant was guilty as charged.
After the Civil War, courts continued to draw on this line of
precedent, especially in cases involving burglary. As with the earlier
cases, courts tended to find a way around the formal consent doctrine
by manipulating the idea of assent or “the meeting of the minds,”
which is common in contract law. Thus, some courts, following the
formal law of contract and agency, concluded that if a decoy was
employed by the police to participate in the burglary with the consent
116
of the owner, there was no burglary.
Some courts dismissed the
consent defense by insisting that an owner, who knows about a crime
in advance and informs authorities, has not given his assent to the
117
crime—an act which would negate an element of the trespass.
Either way, until the very end of the century, most state courts would
not excuse the defendant merely because the detective initiated,
induced, or precipitated the events if the prosecution could prove
118
that all the formal elements of the crime were present.
119
The holding in Board of Commissioners of Excise v. Backus further
110
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
114
Id.
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See State v. Covington, 18. S.C.L. at 569; see also State v. Geze, 8 La. Ann. 52 (La.
1853) (relying on the same precedent to affirm a conviction for a violation of an
ordinance preventing the sale of intoxicating liquor to slaves without the owner’s
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trading with slaves).
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See, e.g., People v. Collins, 53 Cal. 185, 186-87 (Cal. 1878); Speiden v. State, 3
Tex. Ct. App. 157 (1877).
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See, e.g., Allen v. State, 40 Ala. 334, 341 (Ala. 1867); Smith v. State, 43 Tex. 103
(Tex. 1875).
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State v. Jansen, 22 Kan. 498 (Kan. 1879).
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illustrates how courts used private law doctrines to decide the earlier
cases involving decoys and informers. In that case, the Board of
Commissioners of Excise in Onandaga County employed an informer
to buy liquor from Backus, who was ultimately convicted of violating a
120
state prohibition statute. The Commissioners then sued to recover
121
The defense argued that the plaintiffs could not
the penalty.
recover because their cause of action was based on an immoral or
122
illegal act.
To support this proposition, the defense invoked a
common contract principle: courts will not lend their aid in
enforcing an agreement which has, as its ultimate object, the
violation of the law or public policy, or the perpetration of a fraud
123
The court reasoned that because Backus was
upon a third party.
124
guiltier than the Commissioners, the two were not in pari delicto,
and the court ought not shield the more guilty party from the
125
consequences of his act.
In an extended coda, the court praised
the law enforcement techniques used not only to uncover violations
126
of excise laws but also to root out mail fraud and counterfeit rings.
At mid-nineteenth century, courts primarily expressed their
approval of law enforcement tactics involving deceit and trickery to
catch criminals. In 1857, for instance, Illinois authorities hired a
witness to buy liquor from an individual suspected of violating state
127
prohibition laws.
In dismissing an attempt at the entrapment
defense, the court admonished:
If men who voluntarily or otherwise become acquainted with the
secret brothels, gambling and drinking hells with which our cities
and villages are sometimes overrun, and our neighbors and our
children are corrupted and ruined, are to lose their character for
veracity, and are to be denounced as informers and spies, for
seeking out and bringing these evil practices to light, then are our
128
hopes of protection slight indeed.

By the late 1870s and 80s, this high praise for covert operations,
was glaringly absent from court decisions. While clinging to the
language of contract law in disposing of the cases, many courts went
120

Id.
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
“Pari delicto” literally translated means “in equal fault.” GILBERT’S LAW
DICTIONARY 233 (pocket verstion 1997).
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Id.
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29 How. Pr. 33.
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beyond the rubric and denounced the involvement of the state in
their overzealous pursuit of undercover investigations and
129
prosecutions. In Michigan, a lawyer was convicted of taking public
130
records from a courtroom. He had asked his friend, a police guard,
131
to leave the door of the courtroom open.
The guard agreed, but
132
quickly informed authorities.
The stool pigeon and the police
133
In
stood by and arrested him as he shuffled through the papers.
reversing the conviction on the ground that the state consented to
the entry, the court chastised:
[t]he course pursued by the officers in this case was utterly
indefensible. Where a person contemplating the commission of
an offense approaches an officer of the law, and asks his
assistance, it would seem to be the duty of the latter, according to
the plainest principles of duty and justice, to decline to render
such assistance, and to take such steps as would be likely to
134
prevent the commission of the offense[.]

Another court insisted that “it is one of the most disgraceful instances
of criminal contrivance to induce a man to commit a crime in order
135
to get him convicted that has ever been before us.”
The judge
continued by positing that “it is a diabolical business, which if not
136
punishable probably ought to be.”
An Illinois court echoed this
new sentiment: “[s]uch means and agents are more dangerous to the
welfare of society than are the crimes they were intended to detect
137
and the criminals they were to arrest.”
The state cases involving informers and decoys between the close
of the Civil War and the turn of the century dealt with a large
number of scenarios. They included, for example, prosecutions for
138
139
burglary, violations of state excise laws, keeping houses of ill

129
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131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 221-22.
135
People v. McCord, 42 N.W. 1106, 1108 (Mich. 1889).
136
Id.
137
Love v. People, 43 N.E. 710, 711 (Ill. 1896).
138
E.g., Saunders v. People, 38 Mich. 218 (Mich. 1878).
139
E.g., Rater v. State, 49 Ind. 507 (Ind. 1875).

2003

THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE
140

275

141

fame, and bribing public officials. By the 1920s, the vast majority
of state court defendants, who tried to escape conviction with the
entrapment defense, were indicted under state and federal
prohibition laws. While recognizing the theoretical validity of the
142
defense, most courts refused to apply it. Other courts simply held
that entrapment could never excuse defendants of violating liquor
143
A
laws because the law itself did not require malicious intent.
minority of courts, however, either reversed or modified the sentence
144
after severely criticizing the government’s tactics.
While courts encountered the defense with a good deal more
frequency after 1920, the percentage of cases excusing a defendant
on the ground that he was entrapped remained fairly constant
145
throughout the early part of the century.
What is significant,
however, is the changed nature of the defense. Whether state courts
reversed the conviction or not, by the turn of the century, state courts
understood entrapment not in formal, contractual, and private law
terms, but rather as a way of ascertaining voluntariness in the context
of a prevalent and powerful state using increasingly sophisticated law
enforcement techniques. In coping with covert law enforcement
140

E.g., People v. Pinkerton, 44 N.W. 180 (Mich. 1889).
E.g., State v. Dudoussat, 17 So. 685 (La. 1895).
142
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(W. Va. 1929); Claxton v. People, 257 P. 347 (Colo. 1927); State v. R.A. Jackson, 249
P. 688 (Kan. 1926); Cosilito v. State, 151 N.E. 721 (Ind. 1926); State v. Driscoll, 239 P.
1105 (Kan. 1925); State v. Kirkbride, 241 P. 709 (Wyo. 1925); Clark v. People, 239 P.
1025 (Colo. 1925); State v. Abraham, 105 So. 50 (La. 1925); Clark v. State, 145 N.E.
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App. 1925); People v. Norcross, 234 P. 438 (Cal. Ct. App. 1925); Bartholomew v.
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operations, courts stretched contract law to its extreme. The consent
doctrine proved inadequate because, in theory, any defendant could
argue that if the government used decoys, informers, or traps of any
sort it consented to the crime. One court tried to circumvent this
146
problem.
Confronted with a case in which a lawyer bribed public
officials to give him the indictments of a business partner and friend,
the court analyzed intricate legal contortions to distinguish the
147
earlier consent cases.
The court insisted that even though the
officials willingly handed over the indictments to catch the defendant
in the act, there was no consent because there is a difference between
148
public and private ownership of property. If a private party delivers
property to someone voluntarily, then there can be no trespass. If,
however, the property belonged to the state and the state cannot
consent through individual officers, the element of trespass remained
149
unmarred by the district attorney’s voluntary participation.
Not
surprisingly, entrapment soon outgrew its increasingly ill-suited roots
150
in private law concepts.
Early traces of this shift can be found in the last few decades of
the nineteenth century. Courts edged toward a new understanding
of the law that ultimately evolved into the entrapment defense.
Reacting with increasing outrage at police tactics, the courts began to
recognize, albeit in superfluous language not directly related to the
holding of the case, that contract principles could not comprehend
the concept they wished to convey. Thus, a Michigan court
concluded that it is the role of the state “to tend to the elevation and
improvement of the would-be criminal, rather than to his further
151
debasement.”
In another case, the same court noted that the fact
that a defendant had a bad, immoral character could not justify
152
luring him into a specific crime.
146

People v. Mills, 70 N.E. 786 (N.Y. 1904).
See id. at 789-91.
148
See id. at 791, 788-89.
149
Id.
150
Even in that case, Judge O’Brien offered a dissent that focused primarily on
the voluntariness of the defendant’s actions rather than ideas of contract and
property, which are more properly suited to private complaints. Thus, he reasoned
that the conviction should be vacated because there is a difference between a
contemplated crime and unlawful intentions and the state unjustly “stimulat[ed]
unlawful intentions.” Id. (O’Brien, J., dissenting).
151
Saunders, 38 Mich. at 222.
152
People v. McCord, 42 N.W. 1106, 1109 (Mich. 1889). This language may well
have been a part of the new progressive reform discourse. Historians have noted, in
general, a shift from a punitive to a rehabilitative model in charitable movements,
jurisprudence, and reform rhetoric in general. See, e.g., KUNZEL, supra note 56, at 1-9;
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In the late 1890s in Momence, Illinois, a city councilman hired a
private detective firm to prevent a string of robberies that seemed to
153
be plaguing the area. The detective came to town and befriended
some local boys by lavishing them with money and treating them to
154
expensive cigars and liquor. After weeks of feigned friendship, the
detective convinced the defendants to join him in robbing an
155
The appeals court reversed the burglary conviction and
office.
firmly noted that this foreign detective’s “efforts were not directed to
the arrest of criminals, but his mental powers and robust health, with
the use of money, were directed towards an effort to make criminals
156
of these young men.” The court commented, “with plenty to drink
and smoke and eat at his expense, he sought to undermine and
dazzle their mental and moral strength and lead them into the
157
commission of crime.” The principles of contract and the consent
doctrine played a minor role in the case. Rather, the malleability of
human nature, the power of the state, and the state’s endless
resources to transform that nature and change the normal course of
158
events by creating criminals impressed the court. The court noted
“[s]trong men are sometimes unprepared to cope with temptation
and resist encouragement to evil when financially embarrassed and
159
impoverished.”
A far cry from the moralistic musings of the New
York court and its invocation of the unforgiving God of the old
testament, this court began to develop traces of an entrapment
doctrine which could encompass and define a new sort of
individuality—one in which will and identity are no longer set in
stone and the government itself can undermine an individual’s
160
resolve with its vast resources and awesome power.
CLASS IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1990); ALLEN F. DAVIS,
SPEARHEADS FOR REFORM: THE SOCIAL SETTLEMENT AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT,
1890-1914 (1967).
153
Love v. People, 43 N.E. 710, 711 (Ill. 1896).
154
Id.
155
Id. at 712.
156
Id. at 711, 713.
157
Id. at 711.
158
Id. at 713.
159
Id.
160
Some authors refer to this transformation as the product of romanticism. See
Susanna L. Blumenthal, Law and the Creative Mind, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 151, 157-58
(1998). Romanticism is an elusive term but it largely describes a shift from the
sacred to the secular, an effort to reconfigure old norms in new ways. Thus, as one
critic notes, romanticism constituted a broad cultural transformation designed to
“save traditional concepts, schemes, and values which had been based on the relation
of the Creator to his creature and creation, but to reformulate them within the
prevailing two-term system of subject and object, ego and non-ego, the human mind
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By the 1920s, the old incarnation of entrapment, applicable only
when the victim’s consent vitiates a material element of the crime,
virtually disappeared. In its place, state courts developed the modern
version of the entrapment defense. This modern version focuses on
whether criminal intent originated with the defendant. A successful
defense proved that the government manipulated the defendant into
161
committing a crime he would not otherwise have consummated.
Thus, the courts evaluated the actions of government officials and
their informers only insofar as they were relevant in determining the
162
origin of criminal design. Toward the end of the 1920s, one court
approved of the following instruction on entrapment: where the
defendant “had no criminal intent to violate the . . . [law], but is
induced to become a law violator by reason of the arts and wiles of
public officials to depart from the path of being a law-abiding citizen
163
into the commission of crime.”
Another court clarified, “it is not
proper, even during an investigation, to entice or persuade any one
contrary to his own will or inclination, to violate the laws of this state;
and if you find that the criminal design originated not with the
accused, but was conceived in the mind of the officers of the state,
and the accused was by persuasion or inducement lured into the
164
commission of a criminal act,” then it is proper to acquit.
By the
end of the prohibition decade, this language was quite common, and
the question of entrapment had shifted almost entirely from a formal
analysis of the elements of the crime and the evaluation of consent

or consciousness and its transactions with nature.” M.H. ABRAMS, NATURAL
SUPERNATURALISM: TRADITION AND REVOLUTION IN ROMANTIC LITERATURE 13 (1971).
My analysis complements this literature by illustrating how a stable individual
possessing certain natural rights gave way to a more dynamic notion of the self.
Thus, the idea that the human mind is a stable reflection of the natural world
evolved into what some commentators have termed the romantic individual whose
perception and interaction with others transforms both the individual and world
around him. See id. This distinction has also been described in psychological terms.
See JESSICA BENJAMIN, BONDS OF LOVE: PSYCHOANALYSIS, FEMINISM, AND THE PROBLEM OF
DOMINATION 3-50 (1988). In America, cultural historians refer to this shift as the
movement from character to personality. See WARREN SUSSMAN, CULTURE AS HISTORY:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN SOCIETY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 271-87
(1984).
161
See, e.g., State v. Decker, 14 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1929); State v. McKeehan, 279 P.
616 (Idaho 1929); Plue v. People, 193 P. 496 (Colo. 1920); Koscak v. State, 152 N.W.
181 (Wisc. 1915); Reim v. State, 280 P. 627 (Okla. Crim. App. 1929); People v. Harris,
251 P. 823 (Cal. Ct. App. 1926); People v. Barkdoll, 171 P. 440 (Cal. Ct. App. 1918);
People v. Conrad, 102 A.D. 566 (N.Y. App. Div. 1910); Wilcox v. People, 67 P. 343
(Colo. Ct. App. 1902).
162
See supra note 161.
163
State v. Heeron, 226 N.W. 30, 31 (Iowa 1929).
164
State v. Lambert, 269 P. 848 (Wash. 1928).
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with old contract principles to a new focus on the malleability of
human nature in light of the powerful state.
Even in burglary cases, where nineteenth-century courts had
traditionally and uniformly employed the consent doctrine,
twentieth-century judges phrased their opinions in terms of whether
the government, together with its agents, informers, and stool
165
pigeons “induce[d] the original intent.”
In one case decided in
1915, Dr. Sanders, an Alabama state health officer, employed Avery,
an applicant to practice medicine in the state, to help capture a
166
suspect. Avery approached the defendant and offered him $100 to
167
raid Dr. Sanders’s office and steal the medical examination results.
The appeals court reversed the conviction, but not on the ground
that Dr. Sanders consented to the burglary, but because the criminal
intent originated with Dr. Sanders, an agent of the government, not
168
with the defendant.
Therefore, the government could not
prosecute because it had implanted the intent in the defendant’s
169
mind.
Not surprisingly, federal courts dealt with different sorts of
crimes and thus, the entrapment defense arose in different contexts.
The trajectory and development of the federal defense followed the
state courts but lagged behind by about two decades. Regulating
everyday life was largely the business of the states prior to the
170
twentieth century; during this period the federal system rarely
encountered the kinds of law enforcement tactics that drew the
criticism and ire of state court judges. It makes sense, therefore, that
entrapment simply would not come up in federal courts.
By the turn of the century, the entire body of federal criminal
171
law was changing and expanding quite significantly. Most notably,
Congress enacted a number of statutes that insinuated the federal
165

Tones v. State, 88 S.W. 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 1905) (quoting Alexander v.
State, 12 Tex. 540 (1854)).
166
Adams v. State, 69 So. 357, 359 (Ala. Ct. App. 1915).
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id.; see also State v. Currie, 102 N.W. 875, 875-77 (N.D. 1905) (using similar
language in burglary case); Dalton v. State, 39 S.E. 468, 468-69 (Ga. 1901)
(employing this rubric in rejecting entrapment defense to a conviction for
conspiracy to wreck a train).
170
FRIEDMAN, supra note 86, at 674-76. The degree of state regulation of everyday
life in the nineteenth century is itself a matter of some controversy. For an
interesting critique of earlier notions of minimal, liberal nineteenth century state
governments, see WILLIAM NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE LAW AND REGULATION IN
NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1996).
171
See supra PART I; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 86, at 264-67.
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government into what Lawrence Friedman calls the “life-area.”
In
other words, Congress began using the commerce clause to regulate
sex, morals, and daily conduct—areas that had previously occupied a
predominantly local concern. Not only did the federal government
venture into new territory, it also contributed to the growing number
of victimless crimes, crimes against the public, or more particularly,
173
crimes against public morality.
All of these new crimes were
difficult to detect without developing elaborate systems of
174
information and links with the underworld.
175
Significantly, in 1876, Congress passed a statute which imposed
criminal sanctions on anyone who sent obscene matter through the
176
mail. Shortly thereafter, an agent of an anti-vice squad in St. Louis,
known as “The Society of the Suppression of Vice,” approached
postal inspectors with his suspicion that a particular doctor was
177
violating the law.
The postal employees eagerly approved of the
agent’s plan and the agent proceeded to compose a letter to his
178
suspect requesting information about contraception. He signed his
request with a made-up name, Miss Nettie G. Harlan of Butler,
Georgia, and put it in the mail. When the doctor responded with
only thinly veiled illicit information, the postal employees pulled his
179
letter from the mail and gave it to the agent. Relying, in part, on
the consent doctrine drawn from the state burglary cases, the court,
180
in United States v. Whittier, reasoned that even though the defendant
is “as morally guilty as if the letter he was answering had been written
by a person seeking the prohibited information, and not by a
detective,” the situation lies outside the particular language of the
181
statute. In other words, because the defendant’s letter was written
and addressed to a fictitious person, there is no way that it could have
182
given “the prohibited information” to anyone, as required by law.
Patterned once again on private law, on crime with a perpetrator and
a victim, the court developed the first federal precursor to
172

FRIEDMAN, supra note 86, at 265.
See id. at 324-57.
174
Id.
175
This statute was an amendment of the earlier Comstock law of 1865.
176
44 Cong. Ch. 186, 19 Stat. 90 (1876).
177
United States v. Whittier, 28 F. Cas. 591, 593 (E.D. Mo. 1878) (No. 16,688).
For a factual summary of Whittier, see Christopher Moore, The Elusive Foundation of the
Entrapment Defense, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1151 (1995).
178
Moore, supra note 177, at n.62.
179
Id.
180
Whittier, 28 F. Cas. at 593.
181
Id.
182
Id.
173
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entrapment law. Applying an extremely formal interpretation of the
statute, a method in vogue at that time, the court dismissed the
183
indictment.
This doctrine concerning decoys and mail fraud persisted for
decades. Like the analogous state court doctrine of consent,
however, it evolved and changed. In the 1880s and 90s, courts
184
stretched the private law concepts to their extreme. A federal court
in Illinois argued that contributory negligence on the part of the
government could not constitute a defense unless the government
somehow broke the causal relationship between the offender and the
185
Courts simply did not have the language to explain the
offense.
concept. They grasped at familiar doctrine for help, but the causal
relationship between offender and offense proved an odd and
186
awkward way of explaining voluntariness.
Feeling the limits of
private law concepts, courts picked up on the tone of the concurring
opinion in Whittier. Writing separately, Judge Treat focused less on
the letter of the law or the fictitious nature of the “victim,” and
insisted that what was really appalling was the government’s effort to
187
“induce or manufacture crime.”
Faced with the same or similar
statutes, courts further developed that rationale, arguing that the
defendants were not guilty and convictions could not stand where
188
government officials procured the crime.
Following Whittier, one
court rejected an entrapment defense to the aforementioned statute,
arguing that law enforcement traps warrant reversal “when the
189
defendant was the passive tool of the entrapping party.”
The issue
of decoys used to catch violations of various rules involving the mail
reached the United States Supreme Court on several different
190
occasions in the mid-1890s. In United States v. Grimm, the first such
case, Justice Brewer wasted little time in concluding that there is no
defense where the postal inspector did not intend “to induce or
solicit the commission of a crime.” The Court relied on Grimm to
191
dismiss two other pleas for relief under the aforementioned statute.
183

Id. at 594. For a discussion of late-nineteenth century jurisprudence, see
HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 9-30.
184
Most courts used a modified version of the consent doctrine regardless of
whether they upheld or reversed the conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Duff, 6 F.
45 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1881).
185
Bates v. United States, 10 F. 92, 99 (C.C. Ill. 1881).
186
Id.
187
Whittier, 28 F. Cas. at 594 (Treat, J., concurring).
188
E.g., United States v. Adams, 59 F. 674, 677 (D. Or. 1894).
189
Bates, 10 F. at 92.
190
156 U.S. 604, 610 (1895).
191
See United States v. Andrews, 162 U.S. 420, 424 (1896); see also Price v. United
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The first entrapment case, outside of the mail fraud decoy
192
Seven years earlier,
context, reached the federal courts in 1915.
California immigration agents suspected that Woo Wai, a ChineseAmerican merchant, had information about a smuggling ring, which
was so pervasive that it involved various high-level government
193
officials.
Hoping to arrest Woo Wai for violating the immigration
laws and get him “in the door” so he would provide information on
the other suspects, the government agents sought to involve him in
194
an elaborate plan to smuggle illegal Chinese aliens from Mexico.
195
Undaunted,
Woo Wai refused to participate on several occasions.
officials used government funds to hire a detective who brought Woo
Wai from San Francisco to San Diego on two separate occasions in
196
order to entice him to join the operation. After two trips down the
197
coast and extensive coaxing, Woo Wai finally acquiesced. Poised as
Woo Wai crossed the border with the illegal aliens in tow,
immigration agents arrested him and offered him immunity if he
198
cooperated in uncovering the smuggling operation.
He refused,
opting instead to go to trial on the charge that he conspired to bring
199
illegal aliens across the border in violation of the immigration laws.
At trial, Woo Wai argued that the government agents had
200
unfairly lured him into the crime.
The district court promptly
issued an instruction denying the existence of any such defense. On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on two separate
201
grounds.
First, it drew on the state court consent doctrine to
reason that because the government consented to the admission of
202
the aliens, there was no offense.
Second, the court offered its
innovative spin: “sound public policy can be upheld only by denying
the criminality of those who are thus induced to commit acts which
203
infringe the letter of the criminal statutes.” Distinguishing relevant
States, 165 U.S. 311, 315 (1897). Most of the decoy letter cases following Grimm
simply relied on that case to dismiss the defense. See, e.g., Shepard v. United States,
160 F. 584 (8th Cir. 1908).
192
Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915).
193
Id. at 413.
194
Id.
195
Id. at 413-14.
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
Woo Wai, 223 F. at 414-15.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 412-13.
201
Id. at 414-15.
202
Id.
203
Id. at 415.
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state law cases and echoing others, the court held that when the
criminal intent does not originate in the mind of the defendant, he
204
cannot be held responsible.
Thus, the precedent was set. The
court offered two rationales: the first, reminiscent of the older state
cases, reasoned by analogy to private law doctrine; and, the second,
insisted that an act simply was not “criminal” if the government itself
manufactured the crime and manipulated the defendant into
205
committing it.
As the cases progressed into the twentieth century, the language
of consent became more rare, muted by the more pervasive rationale
that an individual defendant cannot act of his own free will if he was
sufficiently manipulated by the government. A few years later,
206
another case arose out of similar facts.
The court concluded
without much difficulty, “[w]here the officers of the law have incited
the party to commit the crime charged and lured him on to its
207
consummation, the law will not authorize a verdict of guilty.” Like
the later state cases, the federal courts that acknowledged the
entrapment defense in the 1910s focused on the origin of the
208
criminal intent.
Courts disagreed on where to draw the line, and as Kenneth
Murchison artfully argues, the outcome of their reasoning often
reflected their own, and the public’s, attitude to the law under which
209
the defendant was indicted. The early state and federal entrapment
cases, however, did not only involve violations of prohibition laws.
Like Woo Wai and the state bribery cases, many were the result of the
efforts of an overzealous reform movement, which had gradually
made its way into various wings of law enforcement. What is striking
about the cases that recognize the defense is not the particular
statutes under which they arose, but rather the organized and
sophisticated nature of the law enforcement offensive considered by
the courts. Both federal and state courts had to reinvent the doctrine
204

Woo Wai, 223 F. at 414.
Id. at 414-16.
206
Yick v. United States, 240 F. 60 (9th Cir. 1917).
207
Id. at 65.
208
Peterson v. United States, 255 F. 433, 435 (9th Cir. 1919) (reversing a
conviction for a wartime offense of selling liquor to soldiers in uniform after
undercover agents harassed the defendant for over three hours in an effort to
procure alcohol); Voves v. United States, 249 F. 191, 192 (7th Cir. 1918) (reversing a
conviction for selling liquor to an Indian); United States v. Healy, 202 F. 349, 351 (D.
Mont. 1913) (reversing a conviction under same law after federal officials hired an
Indian witness, who did not look or seem like an Indian, to procure alcohol from the
defendant).
209
See MURCHISON, supra note 94, at 41-46.
205
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to suit this new situation. They discarded the terms of contract and
other private law models and adopted a new theory of entrapment
based on a new idea of what constitutes voluntary action in the
presence of a large, centralized, and bureaucratic state.
The subtle shift in language may not have had a huge impact on
who served time for which crime, but significantly, both defense
lawyers and judges now framed their understanding of criminal
responsibility in a new way. The idea that the government could
“create” a criminal was a new concept. The twentieth-century legal
doctrine of entrapment, which embodied the idea that the state
wielded some kind of power to manipulate the very essence of its
citizens, was an innovation in the law. The later state and federal
entrapment cases made the implication of this new focus on criminal
intent explicit, excusing a criminal defendant only when the state
authorities created him. Thus, one state court admonished, “decoys
and artifices may be employed to entrap criminals, but not to create
210
them.”
Another rejected the defendant’s claim that the state
211
officials were engaged in a “conspiracy to create a criminal.”
In a
West Virginia court, the judge grasped at various metaphors to
explain the law, stating, there can be no entrapment unless “the
defendant was plastic clay in the hands of the entrappers. . . . It is not
the decoy of a criminal which public policy condemns but the
implanting of the germ of criminality, no matter how favorable the
212
culture.”
Federal courts used the same language to express alarm at the
government’s ability to distort the will of its citizens. In an attempt to
catch a suspect violating an act that prohibed the sale of liquor to
Indians, federal officials hired a witness who did not appear to be an
213
Indian.
The court declared, “[d]ecoys are permissible to entrap
criminals, but not to create them, to present opportunity to those
having intent to or willing to commit crime but not to ensnare the
214
law-abiding in unconscious offending.”
The court reasoned that
the combination between ignorance of fact and government
solicitation “stamps the act as involuntary” because the defendant had
215
become a merely passive instrument of governmental design. The
210

State v. Hester, 146 S.E. 116, 120 (S.C. 1929). For parallel language, see
People v. Schell, 240 Ill. App. 254 (Ill. App. Ct. 1926); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 42
Pa. Super. 38 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1910).
211
State v. Lovell, 272 P. 666 (Kan. 1928).
212
State v. Jarvis, 143 S.E. 235, 236 (W. Va. 1928).
213
Healy, 202 F. at 349.
214
Id. at 350.
215
Id.
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Ninth Circuit echoed this idea of free will noting that, “[t]he
government is not engaged in the business of manufacturing
216
criminals.”
The federal cases that followed in the 1920s similarly
focused the inquiry on the power of the state, through sheer force of
persuasion, to change the course of human conduct and eradicate
217
individual free will.
While the shift was subtle, it is nonetheless evident. The earlier
cases defined will, freedom, and voluntariness by reference to actions.
If a defendant committed an illegal act without physical coercion in
the nineteenth-century cases, he did so of his free will. The consent
doctrine, for instance focused on the victim’s acquiescence in the
crime, not on the defendant’s free will, because the voluntariness of
the defendant’s actions was presupposed. This mirrors the biblical
interaction of Eve and the serpent. The reason God did not excuse
Eve is that she acted against his edict, and was therefore culpable.
The serpent wielded a good deal more power than Eve and his tactics
were certainly unfair, but in the mind of the Old Testament Deity
and the New York court which invoked Him, that was not really
relevant. By the twentieth century, courts had taken a noticeable
turn. In response to a new kind of state with an intricate network of
national, local, and private law enforcement tools at its fingertips,
courts generated and adopted the following new concepts: (1) that
an individual’s will can be undermined; (2) that an individual’s
personality can evolve and change; and (3) that an individual free
from coercion is not necessarily free. Under this rubric, an individual
is not responsible for his acts if the state manipulated his will..
The older idea of character based on a Judeo-Christian
conception of the fixed and unchanging self, with virtues and vices
that can be more or less controlled by the individual, dominated
218
earlier case law. One appellate court made it clear that this version

216

Peterson, 255 F. at 436.
See, e.g., Conway v. United States, 1 F.2d 274, 276 (7th Cir. 1924); Sabbatino v.
United States, 298 F. 409, 411 (2d Cir. 1924); Ritter v. United States, 293 F. 187, 18889 (9th Cir. 1923); Browne v. United States, 290 F. 870, 873-74 (6th Cir. 1923);
DiSalvo v. United States, 2 F.2d 222, 225-26 (8th Cir. 1924).
218
For a broad theoretical discussion of the crisis of the individual in the late
nineteenth century, see Thomas C. Heller & David E. Wellbery, Introduction to
RECONSTRUCTING INDIVIDUALISM: AUTONOMY, INDIVIDUALITY, AND THE SELF IN WESTERN
THOUGHT 7-15 (Thomas C. Heller et al. eds., 1986). The shift from the religious to
the secular in the law occurred throughout the nineteenth century, but it was
especially significant after the Civil War. Thus, this shift in notions of the self was just
one aspect of a much broader trend away from religious conceptions of the self. See
generally ROSS, supra note 56, at 53-64; ABRAMS, supra note 154.
217
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219

no longer suited the modern world. The trial court invoked Jesus
in its jury charge stating, “on the night before the crucifixion, Jesus
tempted Judas Iscariot: that he could have remained away and saved
Judas Iscariot from committing the despicable crime . . . of betraying
his master.” It may be argued, the court continued, that Jesus
tempted Judas, but that provided no excuse because “it was in the
220
heart of this man.” On appeal, the court concluded that it was an
error to rule out the entrapment defense altogether and noted that
221
the instruction was unduly prejudicial.
The emergence of the
defense based on the vulnerability of individuals and the elusiveness
of free will embodied a definition of freedom and individuality that
directly contradicted older biblical notions.
As the doctrine developed across the continent, federal courts
gradually proved more liberal in ordering lower courts to consider all
222
the evidence related to the entrapment defense.
Kenneth
Murchison argues that it was prohibition that prompted courts to
223
open their doors to the new defense.
While the widely
controversial prohibition laws might have served as a catalyst, the
array of cases in the early part of the twenty-first century set the stage.
The language of the defense was already well established in both the
federal and state courts by the time the prohibition cases flooded the
courts. Prohibition may have brought entrapment to the attention of
the federal judiciary in a way that it found hard to ignore but the
defense had already developed over the course of many decades as a
collective response to a radically changed universe of law
enforcement.
Meanwhile, legal commentators were largely unmoved by the
judicial development of the entrapment defense. Nineteenth-century
treatises rarely mentioned the subject and if they did, they did so by
224
explaining the doctrine of consent. In his treatise on criminal law
219

Di Salvo, 2 F.2d at 226.
Id.
221
Id.
222
See MURCHISON, supra note 94, at 29-32.
223
Id.
224
Most treatises did not devote any space to entrapment. See, e.g., FRANCIS
WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW (1896); JOHN MINOR, EXPOSITION OF THE LAW
OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (1894); JOHN WILDER MAY, LAW OF CRIMES (1893); J.H.
BEALE, A SELECTION OF CASES (1894); IRVING BROWNE, THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL
LAW, PRINCIPLES, PLEADING, AND PROCEDURES, FOR THE USE OF LAW SCHOOLS AND
STUDENTS (1892); S.F. HARRIS, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW (1883); JOEL PRENTISS
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1882). The few that did mention it did so in passing and
largely focused on the consent cases. See, e.g., JOHN G. WHALEY, THE CRIMINAL LAW 3739 (1896); WILLIAM CLARK, SELECTED CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW (1895).
220
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published in 1895, for instance, William Clark coupled the fact that
consent to sexual intercourse negates an element of rape with the
notion that a cooperating witness’s consent negates an element of
225
larceny or robbery.
In the early decades of the twentieth century,
the defense drew few comments from students cataloguing cases and
226
even fewer scholarly studies. In the second half of the prohibition
decade, however, academics took a greater interest in entrapment
and, like the courts, they seemed to embrace the defense as if it had
227
always been around.
These later comments, like the court cases
they discussed, generally noted that entrapment serves as a successful
defense where the criminal intent originates with the government
228
agents rather than the accused. As one commentator put it in the
late 1920s, courts apply the defense when “acts of the officers
instigating and procuring the crime have gone so far as to wash the
necessary guilty intent from the mind of the accused and render him
229
a mere tool with no intent.” Another commentator remarked that
the origin of the criminal design is only the beginning of the inquiry;
entrapment can only succeed as a defense if the government
230
deprived the accused of “volition and willing compliance.” Others
put it slightly differently, arguing that if government officials produce
a crime that the defendant would not otherwise have committed, the
231
defendant can claim that he was unjustly entrapped.
Treatises in
225

CLARK, supra note 224, at 23.
The Index to Legal Periodicals did not include entrapment as a category until
1924, and only three articles appeared on the subject. See INDEX TO LEGAL
PERIODICALS AND LAW LIBRARY JOURNAL 81 (1924); see also Leonard J. Calhoun, When
Entrapment is a Bar to Conviction, 10 VA. L. REV. 316 (1924); Criminal Law—Entrapment
to Sell Liquor, 33 YALE L.J. 555 (1924); Entrapping Suspected Criminals, 28 CASE &
COMMENT 263 (1922). See also MURCHISON, supra note 94, at 26.
227
E.g., J. Darwin Bond, Entrapment in Narcotic Law Violations, 20 KY. L.J. 98 (1931).
228
See, e.g., Robert C. Kline, Entrapment Under the National Prohibition Act, 1 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 371, 372 (1932); Recent Case Notes, Criminal Law—Entrapment as a
Defense in Criminal Prosecutions, 1 IDAHO L.J. 93, 93 (1931); Bond, supra note 227, at
99; Recent Decisions, Criminal Law—Trial—Entrapment as a Defense Where Criminal
Intent Originates in Accused, 16 VA. L. REV. 78, 78-79 (1929); Comment, Criminal Law—
Defenses—Entrapment, 2 S. CAL. L. REV. 283, 286 (1928).
229
Criminal Law—Defenses—Entrapment, supra note 228, at 286.
230
Recent Decisions, Criminal Law—Entrapment, 13 ST. LOUIS U. L. REV. 275, 27576 (1928); see also Note, Entrapment as a Defense to Criminal Prosecution, 44 HARV. L.
REV. 109, 109 (1930) (noting that entrapment is reprehensible because “it involves
the creation of a criminal by a governmental agency”).
231
E.g., Recent Cases, Criminal Law— Defenses—Entrapment, 20 ILL. L. REV. 309,
309 (1925); Recent Decisions, Criminal Law—Entrapment, supra note 231, at 275-76;
Recent Cases, Criminal Law—Entrapment—Public Policy, 9 TEX. L. REV. 276, 277-78
(1930); Note, Entrapment as a Defense in Prosecution for Prohibition Violation, 41 YALE L.J.
1249, 1249-51 (1932); Recent Cases, Criminal Law—Entrapment as a Defense, 11 TEX. L.
REV. 385, 385 (1932).
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the second half of the century echoed this sentiment.
While prohibition did not create the entrapment defense, the
growing skepticism about liquor laws prompted both courts and
commentators to adopt a new rationale for the defense. At the end
of the decade, scholars argued that the entrapment defense was
worthwhile because it served to deter the overly aggressive and
invasive behavior of law enforcement officials. They argued that
whether or not the government agents had reasonable suspicion and
acted in good faith prior to setting their trap provides a doctrinal
233
check on executive power.
This reasoning is notably absent from
the earlier judicial decisions implementing the defense, but it did
234
make a subtle appearance in a few cases in the mid-twenties.
In
these cases, courts never explicitly invoked deterrence as the purpose
of entrapment, rather, courts suggested that if the government agents
implemented a trap without reasonable suspicion, they acted contrary
to public policy, which counsels against inducing individuals to
commit crimes, and dictates that courts should not countenance such
235
conduct.
While the lower courts and academics struggled to define the
contours of the entrapment defense, the Supreme Court remained
236
silent. It was not until 1928 that the Court acknowledged this new
defense in federal criminal law. The case which first made its way to
the United States Supreme Court was a narcotics case: Federal agents
suspected that Casey, an attorney, was soaking towels with illegal
237
opiates and delivering them to federal prisoners at a county jail.
Federal narcotics agents recruited George Cicero, a convicted felon
and drug addict, and Mrs. Nelson, another prisoner’s sister-in-law, to
238
serve as their stool pigeons.
The agents installed a dictaphone in
232

CLARK & MARSHALL, LAW OF CRIMES § 162 (3d ed. 1927).
See, e.g., Bond, supra note 227, at 99; Fred J. Ginsburg, Criminal Cases,
Entrapment—Narcotic Sale in Violation of Harrison Narcotic Act, 24 J. CRIM. L. 1109, 110910 (1933); Criminal Law—Defenses—Entrapment, supra note 228, at 286-89. One
author claimed that although courts frame their inquiry in terms of the origin of
criminal intent, they are in fact simply calculating whether the government conduct
was objectively reasonable. Note, Entrapment by Government Officials, 28 COLUM. L.
REV. 1067, 1069 (1928).
234
United States v. Eman Drug Mfg. Co., 271 F. 353 (D. Colo. 1920); see also
United States v. Certain Quantities of Intoxicating Liquors, 290 F. 824 (D.N.H.
1923).
235
See, e.g., De Long v. United States, 4 F.2d 244 (8th Cir. 1925); Certain
Quantities of Intoxicating Liquors, 290 F. 824.
236
MURCHISON, supra note 94, at 32. Murchison points out that, between the years
of 1919 and 1932, the Court declined to grant certiorari on the issue twelve times. Id.
237
Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 416-17 (1928).
238
Id. at 422 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
233
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the attorney-client cage and deposited money in Cicero’s prison
239
credit account.
They listened from an adjacent room while both
240
Without much
Cicero and Nelson solicited drugs from Casey.
comment, Justice Holmes rejected Casey’s plea that he had been
241
242
trapped into committing the crime.
Justice Brandeis dissented.
He remarked that he could not consider the substantive offense
because “officers of the government instigated the commission of the
243
alleged crime.”
Justice Brandeis clarified that his objection does
not rest merely upon the character of the evidence or upon the fact
244
The obstacle to the
that the evidence was illegally obtained.
prosecution lies in the fact that the alleged crime was instigated by
officers of the government; that the act for which the government
seeks to punish the defendant is the fruit of their criminal conspiracy
245
to induce its commission.
Further, the Justice insisted that the government could set
decoys and lay traps, “[b]ut it may not provoke or create a crime and
246
then punish the criminal, its creature.”
Categorizing Casey as a
“detective-made criminal,” Brandeis offered two reasons for his
dissent, arguing that the court could not sanction the government’s
unauthorized and unjustifiable conduct and that Casey’s action could
247
not be considered an act of his own free will.
Four years later, the majority of the Court adopted Brandeis’s
reasoning. In United States v. Sorrells, the defendant was convicted of
248
violating the National Prohibition Act.
At trial, he relied on an
entrapment defense, claiming that government agents staged a crime
249
In an elaborate effort to catch
and lured him into committing it.
Sorrels in an illicit act, a government agent posed as a tourist and
250
recruited Sorrells’s friends to introduce him.
After using various
intelligence sources, he found out that Sorrells had fought in World
251
War I.
The agent then pretended to be a veteran of the same
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240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251

Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 422-23 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 418-19.
Id. at 421 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Casey, 276 U.S. at 421 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 423 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Casey, 276 U.S. at 423-24 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
United States v. Sorrells, 287 U.S. 435, 438 (1932).
Id. at 438-40.
Id. at 439.
Id.
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Division. After winning his confidence in this cunning way, the agent
252
Sorrells finally gave
asked for liquor on three separate occasions.
253
in. The Court noted that:
the evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding that the act for
which defendant was prosecuted was instigated by the prohibition
agent, that it was the creature of his purpose, that defendant had
no previous disposition to commit it . . . and that the agent lured
defendant, otherwise innocent, to its commission by repeated and
persistent solicitation in which he succeeded by taking advantage
of the sentiment aroused by reminiscences of their experiences as
254
companions in arms in the World War.

Chief Justice Hughes paused, “[s]uch a gross abuse of authority given
for the purpose of detecting and punishing crime, and not for the
255
making of criminals, deserves the severest condemnation.”
Following the vast majority of circuits, the Court held that when the
criminal design originates with the government, it may not prosecute
256
the individual who it caught and enticed into its plan.
While the Supreme Court might have used substantive due
process to build the defense permanently into the law, the Court
chose not to do so. Instead, the justices insisted that Congress could
not possibly have intended its statute to cover a situation like this—
where government agents lured an innocent person into committing
257
a crime.
Thus, the defense, which just decades before occupied a
small and precarious position in both state and federal courts, had
evolved into such a commonsense guage of criminal responsibility
that the Supreme Court was willing to conclude it would be absurd
for Congress to have intended any criminal statute to include
prosecution and punishment of those enticed and trapped by
258
government agents.
In Sorrells, the government argued that the
defendant waived the entrapment defense by not mentioning it in his
plea of not guilty and failing to plead it to bar further proceedings

252

Id.
Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 439.
254
Id. at 441.
255
Id.
256
Id. By the time the Court reviewed the issue in Sorrells, entrapment was not a
controversial doctrine and only one justice agreed with the circuit court that no such
defense exists. Id. at 453 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
257
See id. at 448-49. While few contemporary discussions of entrapment explore
the history in full, they all involve some discussion of Sorrells. For a thorough
examination of the opinion, see Roger Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L.
REV. 163, 164 (1976).
258
See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 453.
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under the indictment. The Court rejected this contention, arguing
that it follows from the misconception that the defense is not a denial
of guilt but rather some sort of judicial bar or equitable doctrine that
prevents the government from proceeding when its agents have
260
behaved unjustly.
Entrapment, the Sorrells Court explained, “is
available, not in the view that the accused though guilty may go free,”
but rather pertains directly to the guilt or innocence of the
261
defendant.
It is significant that the Court chose not to use
substantive due process, a doctrine employed throughout the
previous decades, to defeat reform legislation and protect freedom of
contract. Perhaps perceiving the already precarious position of
substantive due process, the Court chose a different track, elevating
this new aspect of freedom above such contractual rights.
Justice Roberts wrote separately to emphasize a slightly different
basis for his adoption of entrapment. Rather than locate the source
of the defense in Congressional intent, Justice Roberts chose to focus
on the inherent supervisory power of the courts. His opinion echoed
the flurry of academic articles published at the end of the previous
decade and a few recent federal cases. The Justice stated that,
“[n]either courts of equity nor those administering legal remedies
tolerate the use of their process to consummate a wrong. The
doctrine of entrapment in criminal law is the analogue of the same
262
rule applied in civil proceedings.”
Justice Roberts argued that,
while cloaked as an effort to tailor the law to a new view of criminal
responsibility, entrapment was really a deterrent. Judges considered
entrapment a judicial rule analogous to the various civil law doctrines
that prevent plaintiffs from resorting to the courts when they have
263
behaved in an illegal or grossly unethical manner.
It may have been the waning popularity of prohibition that
caused the Supreme Court to adopt the entrapment defense and
articulate the new deterrent rationale, but the definition of criminal
responsibility had already shifted. Courts had already redefined the
relationship between the government and the individual. By insisting
that no federal criminal statute could possibly imply otherwise, the
Supreme Court crystallized the relationship and implanted itself in
the role of patrolling this new boundary between state and citizen,
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Id. at 452.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 455 (Roberts, J., concurring).
Id.
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government official and civilian.
Thus, as the scope and reach of both state and federal criminal
law grew at the end of the century, law enforcement grew with it.
Judges and courts, largely without assistance from the academy,
invented the doctrine of entrapment to accommodate this new
265
amorphous form of government. By shifting away from private law
notions of contract, courts slowly redefined criminal responsibility
and realigned the precarious balance between government and the
citizen. With little fanfare, courts and legal doctrine contributed to a
new definition of free will, one which comprehended the power of
the state—through manipulation, trickery, and deception—to alter
personality and change the course of human conduct in some fatal
way. The dominant justification for entrapment finally articulated by
the Supreme Court in Sorrells centered on a definition of freedom
266
and responsibility that had evolved over the past several decades.
Some of the later federal cases, many law review commentaries in the
later part of the 1920s, and the dissent in Sorrells suggest a related but
distinct rationale: that entrapment is necessary for the purity of the
government and its various agencies and agents, and the defense
somehow deters government abuses of power and should be allowed
despite the indisputable guilt of the accused. This sort of reasoning
emerged only after most federal and state courts had adopted the
defense.
It served only a recessive role—while popular with
academics, it did not dominate the early court cases on entrapment.
III. ENTRAPMENT LAW IN CONTEXT
This history of the entrapment defense, discussed in the
preceding section, has spawned two warring tests to evaluate whether
267
a defendant was impermissibly entrapped.
The first of these tests,
the subjective test, asks whether the defendant was predisposed to
commit the crime before encouraged to do so by a government
268
actor. The second test, the objective test, exonerates the defendant
269
if government conduct exceeded acceptable limits. The subjective
test, espoused by the majority of the Sorrells Court, dominated judicial
270
decisions from the beginning of the defense’s history.
This test
264

Id. at 452; see also id. at 457 (Roberts, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Sorells, 287 U.S. 435.
266
Id. at 451-52.
267
PAUL MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 12 (1995).
268
Id. at 53.
269
Id. at 169.
270
Almost all federal courts employ the subjective test. A few state courts have
embraced the objective test, but, like the federal clerkship, most also adhere to some
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makes sense if we view entrapment as a way of approximating
whether the defendant acted of his own free will, rendering him
guilty and responsible under the law. The objective test follows
logically from later rationale, articulated most succinctly by Justice
Roberts in his Sorrells concurrence, that courts should not sanction
271
this sort of abuse of governmental authority.
The history of law enforcement and entrapment is useful
because it illustrates that the defense emerged primarily as a way of
redefining criminal responsibility and autonomy after the Civil War.
Most courts in the first few decades of the defense reasoned that the
accused simply was not guilty if government officials manufactured
the crime and molded the criminal. Judges did not use the defense
primarily to deter, or even to send a message condemning
governmental misconduct until well into the twentieth century. This
chronology is relevant because it helps explain why courts have clung
rather stubbornly to the subjective test in analyzing entrapment. The
two rationales are related in that they both call for a particular
boundary between the individual and the state, but the objective test
follows logically only if the primary role of the defense is to deter
272
governmental misconduct and preserve the purity of the courts.
The subjective test embodies the slightly different earlier concern
about what exactly constitutes criminal responsibility: A person
cannot be considered responsible if he did not act of his own free
will, especially when the government has the power to undermine
free will through its control over resources and information, and
through its power of persuasion.
Following the lead of early academic reflections on entrapment,
most contemporary commentators suggest that courts abandon the
273
impractical, and arguably even futile, subjective test.
While
attempting to ascertain the criminal predisposition of the accused is a
clumsy and imprecise tool, the history of the defense indicates that
we should allow courts to try. This particular inquiry enables courts
to draw, erase, and redraw the line between government and citizen,
a judicial role which has come to make sense to us. Thus, the
frustrating task of locating the origin of criminal intent serves an
important role in providing doctrinal room to shape an evolving
notion of the proper interaction between the state and the individual,
and in securing the position of the courts to police the parameters of
formulation of the subjective test. See MARCUS, supra note 267, at 38.
271
Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 454-55 (Roberts, J., concurring).
272
MARCUS, supra note 267, at 171-73.
273
See infra note 277.
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that precarious relationship.
For example, sparked in part by the controversy over the role of
the independent counsel in uncovering incriminating evidence about
275
former President Bill Clinton and the debate over law enforcement
276
and the Internet, recent literature on the entrapment defense
277
almost universally condemns the subjective test. But, courts do not
appear to comply with the cries of the academy. While the
theoretical critique of the subjective test is perfectly logical, the
subjective formulation perseveres for precisely the same reason that
entrapment emerged in the first place; it allows the law to articulate
and develop its own version of what it means to act freely in the
modern world. By recognizing some elusive moment when the state
has managed to manipulate its citizens and undermine free will
through sheer force of persuasion, courts generate an evolving
definition of freedom and individuality.
In his seminal article, Michael Seidman argues that because
278
there is no such thing as predisposition, the two tests collapse. He
reasons that as long as one equates predisposition with readiness to
commit a crime, courts can only guess at its existence by positing
some level of inducement to which even an innocent, or non279
predisposed person, would respond. Thus, in order to distinguish
the defendant who is worthy of exoneration from the one who is not,
courts will have to analyze the propriety of government conduct—the
280
very factor that the subjective test pretends to ignore. The problem
with this theory, as Ronald Allen points out, is that it assumes what it
is trying to prove—that the only way to evaluate an individual’s state
281
of mind is by reference to an objective test.
Other forms of
274

My argument here is consistent with Lawrence Lessig’s theory of “fidelity in
translation.” See Lawrence Lessig, Understaning Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory,
47 STAN. L. REV. 395 (1995). For another account of the dynamic nature of the
common law, see Michael C. Dorf, Forward, The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112
HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 (1998).
275
James F. Ponsoldt & Stephen Marsh, Entrapment When the Spoken Word is the
Crime, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1199, 1199-1200 (2000).
276
E.g., Katyal, supra note 5.
277
E.g., Ronald J. Allen et al., Clarifying Entrapment, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
407, 410-11 (1999); Paul Marcus, Presenting, Back from the Almost Dead, The Entrapment
Defense, 47 FLA. L. REV. 205, 225-27 (1995); Louis Michael Seidman, The Supreme
Court, Entrapment, and our Criminal Justice Dilemma, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 111, 118-19
(1981). For one notable exception, see Ponsoldt & Marsh, supra note 275, at 122930.
278
Seidman, supra note 277, at 119-20.
279
Id. at 118-19.
280
Id.
281
Allen et al., supra note 277, at 410-11.
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evidence such as character witnesses and the defendant’s own
282
statements, though certainly difficult to evaluate, may be relevant.
Even so, Seidman continues, police officers generally direct
283
their efforts toward those who are predisposed to commit a crime.
The two tests would reach different results only in the rare instance
where the police reasonably but incorrectly assume that a given
284
suspect is predisposed. Allen criticizes this conclusion, arguing that
the objective test questions the propriety of the police officers’
285
He clarifies that the
conduct not the target of their inducement.
two tests collapse because the factfinder has no direct access to a
286
defendant’s state of mind.
The only way to determine
predisposition is by approximating how a reasonable person would
287
behave.
While Seidman’s argument, coupled with Allen’s
amendment, makes sense, it too rests on the premise that because
judges and juries cannot possibly get inside the defendant’s mind,
288
they ought not try.
Additionally, Allen more convincing argues that predisposition is
289
a fictional entity, a concept that cannot really exist. If you assume
that almost everyone would commit a crime if provoked or enticed in
some extreme way, then predisposition by itself cannot distinguish
between those entitled to the entrapment defense and those who are
290
not. He notes,
[t]he real point is that talk of “predisposition” is meaningless and
commits an existential fallacy. A person who takes the bait has
had his price met; a person who does not, has not. But, the
person who does not take the bait almost always surely would take
a higher, even if greatly higher, bait. The failure to take this one
291
is evidence of his price, but not of predisposition.

Allen goes on to argue that while this “silly” idea of
predisposition fails to distinguish between defendants, whether or

282

Id. The propriety of government conduct is only a threshold issue in the
subjective test, because no matter how egregious the agents’ conduct a predisposed
defendant would not be acquitted. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 440
(1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
283
Seidman, supra note 277, at 119-20.
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Id.
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Allen et al., supra note 277, at 411-12.
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Id. at 412.
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Id.
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Seidman, supra note 277, at 126-27.
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Allen et al., supra note 277, at 413.
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Id.
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not they responded to “market level inducements” does. He insists
that we should exonerate only those individuals who responded to
293
inducements that exceed real world market rates.
He envisions
294
Punishing someone who
both a financial and emotional market.
responds to extra-market inducement could not possibly further the
goals of criminal law—to deter, to incapacitate, and to rehabilitate—
while prosecuting a defendant for responding to market level
295
inducements would. Responding to an anticipated adversary, Allen
argues that it may be difficult to ascertain the market price of
inducements but it could not possibly be as futile as the subjective
296
test, which requires “literally proof of the nonexistent.”
Allen scoffs at the courts’ efforts to curb the government’s power
297
to “create criminals.” A modern-day Jerome Frank, Allen seems to
want to purge the law of all its subjective musings. Attempting to
determine a precise market level for the kind of emotional
manipulation involved in sting operations, however, strikes this writer
as equally absurd. He proposes that we estimate this market value by
298
calling in experts.
He suggests that rather than use the fuzzy
evidence to show the defendant’s subjective state of mind, courts can
use experts to determine the market price for emotional
299
manipulation to commit a crime. Relying on expert evidence and
social science in this way ignores the fact that in its unscientific way,
the common law generates its own evolving definition of the self, of
individuality, and responsibility. While at times, resorting to the
social sciences may be appropriate, it cannot always provide the
answer to shaky, indeterminate, and subjective doctrinal judgments.
Any effort to determine a given defendant’s predisposition, like many
other concepts in the law, will involve the factfinder’s generalizing
from her own experience and from what she believes is the normal,
average way to act. That this is the case does not necessarily mean
courts should abandon efforts to approximate subjective intent.
Language is imprecise. But a critique of the law based on this
premise, taken to its extreme, threatens to undermine the entire
endeavor. If courts defer questions of criminal responsibility and the
definition of free will to the social sciences, they essentially abdicate a
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299

See id. at 414-21.
Id. at 415.
Id.
Allen et al., supra note 277, at 415-16.
Id. at 418.
Id. at 417.
Id. at 418.
Id. at 418-19.

2003

THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE

297
300

valuable role in generating the meaning of those terms over time.
Allen proceeds to argue that given his understanding of
entrapment, courts should also apply the doctrine when it is a private
individual rather than the state that employs “extra-market”
301
inducements to lure someone into committing a crime.
Courts
throughout the century have rejected this notion and again, it simply
defies commonsense. Entrapment is not a private law concept. To
the contrary, it appeared when it did because private law models
could not comprehend individual freedom with respect to the
modern state. The government could no longer pretend to be a
neutral arbiter between individuals, and entrapment served to
redefine freedom and criminal responsibility in the face of this
changed reality. As such, applying the defense to private actors
would be a radical and unwarranted departure from the history of
entrapment.
CONCLUSION
Entrapment emerged at the turn of the century as a new way of
policing the boundary between the government and the individual.
As law enforcement’s control over information and intelligence
magnified, courts acknowledged the defense. They did so because
freedom no longer seemed natural or inevitable in light of the
governments newfound power. While both the objective and
subjective tests are sloppy, the idea of predisposition involved in the
subjective test is the most reasonable way for courts to determine how
much control the defendant had over his own actions and thus,
whether he ought to be held responsible. This may require the fact
finder to resort to his own experience writ large, to what sort of
inducements seem unfair, and to some approximation of what kind
of inducements would lead most normal people to commit crimes.
Judges and juries do this anyway. While Allen and Seidman’s analyses
reveal the futility of searching for origins of subjective intent, their
critiques echo those of the progressive legal thinkers a century ago.
Law in the post-Realist world has in many ways conceded to those
sorts of criticisms by focusing largely on objective tests. Entrapment
resisted the general trend. In so doing, is one of the arenas of legal
300

My point here is consistent with, though slightly different from, that of
Ponsoldt and Marsh who insist that criminal laws without a moral component are
likely to fail. See Ponsoldt & Marsh, supra note 275, at 1229-30. It is too general to
assert that all criminal laws ought to be subjective or ought to have a moral
component. The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, for instance, is a criminal
law with virtually no moral aspect. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
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doctrine that has preserved a role for courts in redefining
individuality and freedom in the face of the radically changed nature
of both state and federal government. While it can be useful to
expose myths in the law, it is not always necessary to discard them.
Asking whether the government created the criminal and whether
the accused was predisposed to commit the crime integrates into the
law a general notion that the government’s monopoly over
intelligence and information can undermine free will, and that it is
the court’s role to preserve and protect it.
As Susanna Blumenthal argues in her article on the creative role
of the American judiciary, “[a]lthough the American concept of the
rule of law may entail the suppression of judicial subjectivity, it seems
302
also to require an exponent in the form of the human judge.” This
irony is difficult for some commentators to comprehend. Thus, they
seek to purge the doctrine of its subjective component.
Entrapment’s stubborn resistance to this trend, however, reflects an
understandable need to believe in the rule of law, or more
particularly the role of criminal law in punishing only those who are
in some personal sense responsible for their actions. At once
invoking and critiquing Jerome Frank, Blumenthal concludes, that
the fact we continue to trust the “finite figure” of the judge “with a
task of such magnitude suggests that he cannot simply be viewed as a
romantic survival. He expresses what is perhaps a more fundamental
303
and unyielding human impulse to see beyond ourselves.” Similarly,
the subjective test for entrapment is not just a remnant of a more
innocent time. While it is true that judges and juries will inject the
notion of predisposition with all sorts of their own perceptions, that
fact alone does not necessarily counsel against the perpetuation of
the concept. By withstanding the trend toward the objective, the
history of entrapment illustrates that pockets of the law remain myths
that we, as a community, need to believe in. The myth of
predisposition, or the unattainable goal of figuring out when the
government has created a criminal, is not silly at all. It may be
impossible to ascertain with any precision, but it reflects a willingness
and desire to believe that our laws are more than just social science
applied mechanistically to human interaction. The subjective test in
this particular area of the law preserves a certain distinct and useful
304
role for the courts in defining freedom and autonomy. It is part of
302

Blumenthal, supra note 160, at 227-28.
Id. at 228.
304
On the role of free will as myth in criminal law, see HERBERT PACKER, THE
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an evolving understanding, created through time by judges and
juries—of what it means to be a free individual in the midst of a
growingly diffuse state.
Even if we accept that in some form the subjective test is here to
stay, more recent analyses have struggled to make sense of the
305
Supreme Court’s definition of “predisposition.”
In Jacobson v.
306
United States, the jury found the defendant guilty of violating a
statutory prohibition against knowingly receiving child pornography
307
in the mail. The jury rejected Jacobson’s entrapment defense and
the circuit court affirmed, finding that the government had proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that he was predisposed to commit the
308
crime.
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Jacobson was
309
entrapped as a matter of law. Seemingly adhering to the subjective
test, the Court insisted that the predisposition analysis is distinct from
the nature of the government’s conduct. Accordingly, the Court
focused on whether Jacobson was predisposed to violate the law
310
before government officials intervened.
Government agents got Jacobson’s name from a list of people
who had received magazines depicting nude teenage boys before
Congress criminalized such conduct. After Congress passed the
statute three months later, two separate government agencies
coordinated a campaign to tempt the defendant into violating the
311
law. After resisting various solicitations over the course of two years,
Jacobson gave in and ordered a child-pornography magazine from a
312
fictitious organization invented by the government.
The Court
admitted that Jacobson was predisposed to commit the crime
immediately before he purchased the illicit material but noted that
the critical inquiry was whether he was equally disposed before the

305

See, e.g., Ponsoldt & Marsh, supra note 275, at 1210-11.
Jacobson, 503 U.S. 540 (1992).
307
See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)(A) (2003).
308
Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 542.
309
Id.
310
Id. at 553-54 (“[W]hen the Government’s quest for convictions leads to the
apprehension of an otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own devices likely
would have never run afoul of the law.”).
311
Id. at 543. Among other things, the government sent mailings from fictitious
organizations that claimed to be fighting censorship. Others asked him questions
about his sexuality as part of a questionnaire. The government even created a fake
correspondence from an individual who claimed to share Jacobson’s particular
sexual perversions. Finally, Jacobson relented and ordered a magazine from one of
the fake organizations. See id. at 544-47.
312
Id. at 547.
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government entangled itself in his life two years before. Ruling that
a defendant must be predisposed prior to any government
involvement, the Court found the pre-investigation evidence
314
wanting.
In the wake of this decision, circuit courts have disagreed over
whether Jacobson redefined entrapment to include an objective test
315
316
for predisposition.
In United States v. Hollingsworth, an opinion
authored by Judge Posner, the Seventh Circuit held that someone is
predisposed to commit a crime if he would have committed it without
317
government interference. Judge Posner argued that Jacobson put a
new objective spin on the predisposition analysis, directing us to
examine the defendant’s objective circumstances to ascertain
whether he would have refrained from committing a crime “but for”
318
the government’s meddling. In other words, if ample opportunity
to commit the crime would have arisen anyway, then the fact that the
government provided an additional incentive might not matter. The
319
First Circuit disagreed.
It held that someone is predisposed if he
320
would have committed the crime given an “ordinary opportunity.”
In a recent analysis, James Ponsoldt and Stephen Marsh argue
persuasively that the objective element in the Seventh Circuit test is
321
simply unwarranted by Jacobson. Thus, they conclude that “nothing
in the Court’s opinion . . . endorses the notion that a person willing
but unlikely to commit a crime is the sort of ‘law-abiding citizen’ for
322
whom an entrapment defense should be available.”
While the
Court’s recent entrapment case lends some support for paying
increased attention to the nature of the government’s offensive (an
objective component), it is perfectly consistent with the early history
of entrapment law because it focuses entirely on the defendant’s state
of mind. Any evidence of exactly what the government did is relevant
313

Id. at 549.
Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 550-51.
315
Compare United States v. Knox, 112 F.3d 802, 808 (5th Cir. 1997), and United
States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1201 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc), with United
States v. Thickstun, 110 F.3d 1394, 1398 (9th Cir. 1997), and United States v.
Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 961 (1st Cir. 1994).
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27 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
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Id. at 1200.
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only insofar as it helps us approximate that subjective state.
The First Circuit proffers a test that provides a perfect balance.
The test resembles a version of Allen’s market analysis stripped of its
sterile language. In United States v. Gendron, Judge Breyer ruled that if
a defendant would have committed the crime given an “’ordinary
opportunity,’” or an inducement that could not be categorized as
323
improper, then he is predisposed.
In thinking about
predisposition, the jury and the judge will have no choice but to
question what one would do if presented with an ordinary
324
opportunity As Ponsoldt and Marsh put it,
[t]he Government’s conduct has a bearing in assessing the
probative value of the defendant’s reluctance in relation to the
Government’s solicitation. In answering the ultimate question . . .
however, the court (or jury) will have to “assume away” the
Government’s conduct and ask how the defendant would have
325
responded had that conduct not been present.

By asking whether the defendant would have committed the crime
given an ordinary opportunity, Gendron factors in the calculus of
326
whether the government’s conduct was particularly egregious.
However, the primary purpose of the test remains to determine the
defendant’s subjective state of mind: Was he willing, rather than was
he likely, to have committed the crime anyway?
Not surprisingly, Judge Posner cannot help but reveal an ulterior
327
motive for his reading of Jacobson. In Hollingsworth, he remarks that
the “but-for” causation test for predisposition produces the most
328
socially productive result.
Like Allen, Posner’s economic analysis
favors an objective test. Forced to work within the confines of
stubborn Supreme Court precedent, he thinly disguises the wolf in
sheep’s clothing. As I argued above, the entrapment defense
emerged not to supplement the growing reliance on social science
and public policy but to resist the trend. Muddling over the
subjective state of mind preserves a creative role for the judiciary in
329
developing definitions of freedom and human responsibility.
In
323

Gendron, 18 F.3d at 961. Judge Breyer recognized that in order to qualify as an
improper inducement, the government would have to do something besides merely
provide the opportunity to commit a crime. Thus, an “ordinary opportunity” means
a government-sponsored opportunity without excessive additional pressure. Id.
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order to continue to do so, it seems fair to recognize the difficulty of
discerning a defendant’s state of mind prior to the government’s
enforcement efforts, but it would be an error to transform the
purpose of the defense by resorting to law and economics or policy
decisions and replacing the subjective with an objective analysis.
The concept of entrapment emerged when it did because law
enforcement outgrew its traditional status, and, perhaps, the defense
needs to flex and change with a new breed of national intelligence,
which has elaborate new tools at its fingertips. Efforts to trap
individuals using modern technology like the Internet should force
us to rethink entrapment and to redefine what constitutes
predisposition, but it should not change the skeleton of the defense.
Judge Posner quite artfully tries to do what Seidman considered
inevitable. He wraps what is in essence an objective test in a
subjective package. In the process he distorts United States Supreme
Court precedent and betrays nearly a century of evolving doctrine.
Judge Breyer, to the contrary, has intuited a better way to allow
entrapment to evolve in response to the changing nature of law
enforcement without altering the fundamental purpose of the
defense. The goal of preserving doctrinal room for courts to define
individuality and freedom may seem antiquated in our post-Realist
world. It is a myth, however, which has persisted. This myth should
continue to weave its way, because we, as a community, need to
believe in it.

using my historical analysis to argue against Posner’s call for an increased reliance on
the social sciences. See Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1, 12 (1998). Given the history of the defense, it is not appropriate to apply law
and economics in this setting. For a discussion of how law and economics might be
applied in the context of the criminal law, see Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1538-47 (1998).

